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abstract:  The current process of globalization has produced an increase 
in the societal role played by companies, in their power and consequently 
in their responsibility. Any ethical reflection on companies must therefore 
be able to rise to the challenge of justifying a critical approach which 
enables us to rethink the role and thus the legitimacy of companies in 
modern society, and at the same time provide a universalist approach 
able to explain moral judgments and the problems of the moral validity 
of business activity within global economic contexts. 
This paper sets out to present the essential characteristics of a business 
ethics which unifies these two approaches. It puts forward a proposal for an 
integrative business ethics which applies the Discourse Ethics developed by 
J. Habermas to the business environment. It is defined as integrative since 
it takes the internal connection between ethics and business as its starting 
point and because it knows that as an applied ethics, it must combine 
strictly normative approaches with descriptive ones. As with all proposals, 
many questions remain open and many issues have yet to be resolved. 
Despite this, this paper sets out to show that discourse ethics provides a 
sound platform on which to consider questions of the legitimacy of and 
consequently trust in our organizations in plural and global contexts.
Keywords: business ethics, Habermas, civil society, moral contract.
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Business activity is now fully established within the global context, 
and indeed the possibilities of an ethical reflection on companies that are 
limited to the confines of a specific community or culture or particular 
state boundaries are nil. More than ever before, this global social setting 
is what demands the universality that has always characterized moral 
judgments. We need a universal perspective which enables us to put 
forward reasons to defend or criticize the moral validity of company 
expectations and obligations, together with the values and norms that 
underpin them, in any given context or culture. This is one of advantages 
of discourse ethics: it offers a morally grounded justification on which a 
global business ethics can be constructed. 
For discourse ethics, the basic task of moral theory is to establish what 
is known as the moral point of view, understood as a criterion, procedure, 
or principle from which to decide on the moral validity of our decisions 
and actions, norms and organizations. It is well-known that this ethical 
theory has a pragmatic-transcendental grounding which enables it to 
justify a principle of universalization based on the essential assumptions 
of argumentation, the rules which definitively permit the use of language 
(Habermas 1991a; Rehg 1997; García-Marzá 1992). Practical rationality 
is procedural in nature, since such a principle requires the moral validity 
of a norm to depend on the possibility of finding agreement or consensus 
amongst all those involved in or affected by it. Specifically, Habermas 
defines the principle of universalization as a rule of the line of argument 
which makes practical discourse possible and, through this, intersubjective 
recognition of the claims to moral validity. In short, it allows us to look 
for dialogue- and consensus-based solutions to conflict, thereby discovering 
common or general interests (Habermas 1993: 53; Habermas 1991a: 11).
Although this moral principle allows us to justify moral norms, it 
tells us nothing about their possible application. We cannot respond to 
questions like: “What must I or we do?”, “What is the moral way to 
act in specific circumstances?” and “What does good business practice 
mean in a particular context?” based solely on normative validity or the 
fairness of a norm resulting from the application of the moral principle 
proposed. Following Günther, Habermas tells us that a further step must 
be added to the universal capacity to obtain knowledge, to the possibility 
of agreement: the step of necessarily making it appropriate to a particular 
context. In other words, the moral rationality of an action, decision, or 
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norm is measured not in one stage, but two: an interpretation of the 
particular context and circumstances must necessarily be added to the 
moral stage of universalization; it must be determined whether everyone 
considers it to be appropriate to go ahead in all the situations to which 
the norm is applicable (Günther 1989, Cortina 1993). 
Within the context of application, we are more concerned with situations 
in which the moral validity of given norms has been questioned or in 
which we want to use morally valid norms. Now the issue is not whether 
the norm expresses interests that are equally acceptable to everyone but 
whether it can be applied in view of all the defining characteristics of the 
conflictive situation. The impartiality required by the moral point of 
view would be defined by the sum of these two principles. In order to 
correctly apply the moral criterion to the praxis, criteria of coherence or 
compatibility between the grounded validity and the circumstances of the 
particular problem are needed. Hence, as proposed below, this stage of 
appropriateness is an intermediate stage between the ideal and its practical 
application (Cortina, García-Marzá, Conill, 2008).
In my opinion, however, although Habermas allows that the practical-
moral discourse, that is, the moral use of practical reason, aims to both 
justify and apply the norms that establish reciprocal rights and obligations, 
little is found in his writings on questions of application. Indeed, Habermas 
only focuses on individual application and, outside this sphere, does not 
go beyond juridical limits; in other words, he stays within the sphere of 
law. In his writings, the leap from the development and construction of 
the individual will to the collective will, that is, the step from I to we, is 
normally reduced to the realm of its institutionalization as the democratic 
rule of law. According to Habermas, “the problem of the demanding 
quality of moral norms encourages the step from the moral to the law”. 
In other words, it seems that the sphere of application to the various 
institutionalized praxes cannot go beyond a political theory or a theory 
of the state, thereby, in my view, leaving the validity also demanded by 
social structures and practices which integrate and generate moral values 
and norms uncovered. Habermas states: “Practical discourse can only 
perform a critical function when the issue in need of regulation refers 
to interests which are susceptible to universalization. While only private 
interests are at stake, the practical development and construction of a 
common will has to take the form of compromise” (Habermas 1991a: 14).
The reason for this omission can be found in Habermas’ narrow 
concept of civil society (García-Marzá, 2004: 41). The absence of any 
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specific moral treatment of the various organizations making up civil 
society could derive from the sharp distinction he makes between the 
state and civil society (Habermas 1991b: 435; Cohen and Arato 1992). 
Civil society can be conceived from the logic of communicative action, 
from understanding and agreement, as Habermas does so well. However, 
in my view, this does not imply that we must exclude institutions which 
have with differentiated power structures and deal with private interests. 
Negotiations, compromises, and agreements that demand moral validity 
also arise within these institutions. Habermas is aware of this situation 
when, further on in the same text, he states: “But within all this it must 
not be forgotten that in order to obtain fair compromises, morally justified 
procedures are required from them.”
We need to come up with a broader concept of civil society to be used 
as appropriate operating grounds for applied ethics. In my opinion, the 
problem of the demanding moral quality of certain interests leads to the law 
but does not end there. The role of the law must be clarified, as must the 
role of voluntary conflict resolution mechanisms within civil society. The 
law is absolutely necessary but totally inadequate. Not even compliance with 
the law can be explained by juridical mechanisms alone, as legislation itself 
demands a legitimacy and trust which go beyond the threat of sanctions and 
fear. This difference between action and coordinated mechanisms enables 
us to distinguish civil society as an entire performative sphere.
Even though they contain the moral reference of their legitimacy, 
judicial-administrative mechanisms to coordinate and regulate actions 
are supported by external coercion. However, moral mechanisms are 
entirely supported by self-obligation, by personal conviction, and by the 
quest for mutually acceptable solutions established through consensus. If 
freedom and free will are basic characteristics of civil society in its broadest 
sense, it is obvious that we are on ethical grounds, since autonomy, and 
therefore free acceptance, become the sole criterion for the construction 
of social relations. The governing idea that defines the importance of 
applied ethics is that it is a resource which permits social and contractual 
relations that patently do not replace the law but complement it. My 
proposal consists of using the concept of moral resources for such moral 
mechanisms (García-Marzá, 2004: 49).
Without this application of ethics to the various spheres of civil society, 
whether they be economic and business praxis, medical and hospital 
praxis, or the media, it is impossible to explain the moral resources which 
actually work as coordination mechanisms in the day-to-day operation of 
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these institutions (Hirschman 1984:56). We cannot explain the contracts 
established nor the actual agreements reached; we cannot even explain 
the base of social legitimacy which all of them claim and upon which 
social trust is sustained. In turn, strategic rationality cannot explain the 
rational conviction which accompanies moral validity and which we use as 
actors in the different praxes. If we are capable of explaining the internal 
sense of these moral resources, then applied ethics can emerge as a basic 
instrument in the structuring of civil society. 
Within civil society, the situations for the application of moral norms 
are always interpreted from the horizon of a particular Lebenswelt. They 
concern established social relations, cultural contexts, defined interests, 
and the particular motivations of the individual. The issue is no longer 
the grounding of the norm for all those affected but its application in 
organizational contexts where conflicts of interests arise and where we 
must be able to situate the moral principle within the particular sense of 
each praxis or institution, since decisions are never taken in a vacuum but 
under pressure from various contexts and logics. An applied ethics must 
therefore always be based on the sense or raison d’être of each of the 
praxes that have reached a certain degree of institutionalization (Cortina, 
García-Marzá, Conill, 2008). 
In the case of companies, they are organizations in which different 
interests are intertwined, many of them in conflict with each other and 
with blatant imbalances of power, with power understood as the capacity 
to identify and satisfy these interests. This does not mean that universal 
interests are not also at stake, or that, for the same reason, we might not 
encounter expectations and demands of a moral nature. For example, in 
day-to-day operations, we usually demand behaviors from business praxes 
that go beyond legal obligations, and yet they are not perceived as a sacrifice 
beyond the call of duty. They are demands or obligations that we expect 
the company to meet and on which we require their social credibility or 
legitimacy, and in the final analysis, our trust, to hinge (García-Marzá, 2006). 
For instance, in the case of environmental responsibility, respect for the 
natural environment is one factor in the legitimacy or social credibility of 
a company, whether or not it is bound by relevant legislation. Moreover, 
nowadays legislation can do very little to counter problems such as pollution 
which, by definition, go beyond legal state boundaries. We could also add 
that moral validity is demanded in many actions that, though covered by 
legislation, cannot be justified from a moral point of view and quickly 
lead to social disrepute and loss of reputation. 
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The need for business ethics as applied ethics arises not only out 
of considerations and moral judgments to which the negotiations and 
compromises between private interests are liable; rather they essentially 
derive from the fact that generalizable interests, universal interests, are 
also at stake, and if not satisfied they can give rise to clear situations of 
injustice that must be denounced, as is the case when the moral minimums 
of human rights are not met. As an organization, the company itself 
demands validity, a social legitimacy for itself which is not solely based 
on economic benefit or on meeting legal requirements, but which also 
depends on its posture in relation to these universal values. This is even 
truer nowadays, given the increase in companies’ power and their subsequent 
responsibility, which is rooted in ever-growing internationalization (Enderle 
2001; Donaldson 1989).
Hence, we cannot explain these moral resources, such as credibility 
or trust, operating in the business praxis if we are unable to define a 
methodology based precisely on the sense through which the participants 
themselves understand the activity in which they are involved. The 
reconstructive methodology proposed by discourse ethics is, in my view, 
a fitting theoretical means to explain this sense, provided that it also 
extends to the various spheres of civil society, in our case in the sense 
that it is actually intrinsic to the different stakeholders in the company’s 
organization, including workers, clients, shareholders, etc. In my opinion, 
discourse theory, and the communicative action theory which sustains it, 
enables us to explain this implicit knowledge used in trust mechanisms 
or in reaching agreements which, though they might fall within the legal 
framework, can be distinguished from strategic mechanisms. This is what 
I shall attempt to define in the following section. 
the cRItIcaL PeRsPectIve: the moRaL coNtRact IN the 
comPaNy
  
The fact that we cannot begin to conceive of companies without an 
ethical perspective demonstrates the everyday nature of our own moral 
language. We do not make value judgments, nor do we use the terms good 
or bad, right or wrong, fair or unfair to refer merely to the company’s 
economic profits. We say that a certain behavior was wrong when privileged 
information was used or when the terms of a contract were not met, 
that such and such a salary is unfair given the economic returns of the 
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company, and even that the way a certain company has made its profits 
is not moral, such as if it is due to the exploitation of the environment 
or the use of child labor. The most significant aspect of these judgments 
is that when we are making them, we do not consider them to be our 
personal subjective point of view, and we are even convinced that they have 
nothing to do with traditional or community-based prejudices. Rather, we 
claim an intersubjective validity for them: we believe we have the reasons 
to convince anybody who might pose the same question. Clear proof of 
this is that we continue to use moral language when the actions or their 
consequences go beyond all forms of judicial or cultural boundaries. 
The basic task of business ethics as applied ethics is first to reconstruct 
the rational bases of these moral judgments applied to companies (García-
Marzá, 2004). As an ethical theory, applied ethics works to reconstruct 
the internal sense of the normative claims to validity with which we 
understand company activity and which arise both at individual decision 
and action levels and at organizational and system levels. In all these cases, 
moral judgment comes from the expectations, demands, and obligations 
that define all social relations, including, it goes without saying, contractual 
and economic relations. These expectations are connected to the basic 
sense or purpose of companies, and their reconstruction gives us access 
to the moral criteria used to make moral judgments. The ultimate goal 
is to intervene in the business activity in order to enhance the ethical 
quality of business decisions and actions. From this goal, we can speak 
of an ethical management of trust.
On the level of the company as a corporation, with which we are 
essentially concerned in this paper, this moral language points to a fact 
that is vital to the existence of the company: its need for legitimacy. As 
with any organization, the company requires and demands validity for 
its existence and social credibility. Since Weber, legitimacy has generally 
been understood as the validity that comes hand in hand with power, 
as the need for self-justification shared by all power structures. It is the 
belief or conviction that the way it operates reflects certain expectations 
held by society and by the various groups involved in or affected by its 
activity. In this way, we understand legitimacy as a normative claim to 
validity that the company as a corporation demands for itself. In short, 
legitimacy consists of a set of reasons that justify the social presence of 
the company, its function, and its raison d’ètre, the thing that makes it 
necessary and distinguishes it from other organizations or from other 
ways of structuring power to achieve the same purpose.
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A good example of the need for social approval is the growing importance 
of company reputation nowadays. Relationships of trust between different 
stakeholders and between these stakeholders and the company depend largely 
on a good reputation. The same holds true among different companies in 
the market: this determines which product is purchased, which business 
partner is chosen, or which fund is invested in, and so on. The concept 
of whether or not a company is trustworthy goes well beyond the profits 
it makes and affects the relations among all the stakeholders within the 
company, as well as among different companies. Nowadays, the speed with 
which companies respond to the criticisms of a globalized public opinion is 
another good example of how we are facing a perfectly identifiable social fact.
Having said all that, company legitimacy is not limited to moral 
legitimacy. I am not saying that this aspiration to legitimacy is found 
exclusively within the moral sphere but that it cannot be understood without 
the recognition of a moral dimension; that is, interests or claims related to 
what we understand as the dignity of the individual are always at stake. Of 
course, the need for justification has economic, legal, and cultural elements 
(Reed 1999, 23-35). Yet our moral language, and naturally the news in 
the financial newspapers, show how absurd it is to think that legitimacy 
depends solely on economic benefit, or even benefit together with the 
fulfillment of legal obligations. Examples abound of law-abiding companies 
with large profits that still arouse public suspicion and mistrust, perhaps 
due to their behavior in other countries, their hiring and firing policies, 
or their lackadaisical attitude towards their environmental responsibilities. 
This situation cannot be endured without the help of massive settlement 
costs such as those incurred by advertising campaigns.
A discourse business ethics approach must explain how legitimacy 
cannot be reduced to an empirical phenomenon explained by strictly 
psychological or strategic reasons, such as manipulation or deceit. The 
very fact that we are able to identify deceit or manipulation, in other 
words, the need to hide immoral conduct, shows the existence of a 
cognitive base, or a rational claim to validity which, as its name indicates, 
can be verified and, if necessary, criticized, regardless of its psychological 
efficiency. The difference between what can be done but not said, the 
principle of publicity of which Kant spoke, is an excellent methodology 
for reconstructing this potential reason on which legitimacy is supported 
(García-Marzá, 2004, 205).
Once these clarifications have been made, we can say that a company 
is legitimate in its actions when we have good reason to defend it or argue 
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that it is satisfactorily meeting the expectations placed upon it. In this 
case, it is generally said that we trust the relations and behavior of the 
company as a corporation. This trust is the flip side of legitimacy and is 
just as much the antecedent as the result of the rational conviction that 
the company is working properly. In this sense, it is serving the purpose 
of reducing the uncertainty and complexity of our current economic 
contexts (Mayer et al. 1995, 709-734; Rousseau et al. 1998, 393-404). 
Here we run into the first problem, as it is difficult to imagine how 
this legitimacy can be accorded from a rational agreement between the 
parties when we are faced with a clear example of what Putnam calls a 
vertical association, whose basic characteristic is the presence of actors in 
asymmetrical power relationships who therefore face unequal circumstances 
when settling their interests (Putman 1993,173). How can we speak of 
trust in light of these premises?
From the perspective of this set of expectations, the company clearly 
appears as a permanently unstable balance of different interests with a 
clear difference in the capacities and opportunities available to satisfy 
these interests. If we take a definition of power as the ability to define 
and satisfy interests, the company starts out with clear power inequality. 
In this way, we cannot uphold a neutral vision divorced from moral 
considerations, since we are not dealing with a private activity that simply 
affects its owners. Rather, we are looking at an activity that demands a 
cooperative effort and that, above all, also affects individuals outside the 
institution, such as clients or members of the community. When we 
ponder the legitimacy or rational bases of trust, as complementary terms, 
we look towards the company as a particular way of finding order and 
direction among people with diverse potentials and conflicting interests. 
The company represents a set of common interests but at the same time 
a series of divergent, even antagonistic interests. 
As in any organization, the company is comprised of a complex system of 
power relations; of task, burden and benefit distribution; and of cooperation 
and conflict systems. By limiting legitimacy or trust to economic benefit, 
we could fall into the naive idea that, as an element of civil society, being 
a party involved in the activities of business is a free and voluntary matter. 
We must not forget that as long as social and economic conditions constrain 
workers or clients to sign their part of the contract, in other words, as 
long as there are no alternatives when taking a position of whether or 
not to sign a job contract or to buy a product or service, we are facing 
real situations of dependency. In short, dependency exists as long as equal 
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conditions for defining and satisfying the interests at stake are nonexistent. 
 However, and this is the basic question that an ethical reflection should 
be concerned with, in spite of these asymmetrical relations, companies need 
and demand expectations of cooperation which do not tally well with these 
asymmetrical power positions. Without these intangible resources, without 
the necessary social capital in the form of trust and corporate credibility, 
the costs of interaction based on selfishness, mistrust, opportunism, the 
shirking of responsibilities, and so on, would sooner or later make the 
institution unviable. Moral resources thus represent a basic factor in the 
company’s performance, however difficult it might be to account for 
them on the final balance sheet. 
To be able to explain these resources, particularly in the moral dimension 
of legitimacy or trust, we have to adopt an alternative to the traditional 
methodology. From an outsider’s neutral perspective, we can persist in 
referring to the company as a private activity, an internal matter pertaining 
to the owners for whom the other groups are simply a means of obtaining 
economic benefit (Vallance 1995, 29). Still, from the observer’s perspective, 
we can also go one step further and describe the company from the 
perspective of game theory, as the interaction between two inevitably 
antagonistic interest groups in which some always win and others always 
lose (García-Marzá, 2006). This objective viewpoint could even be extended 
to the point where the company is given a pluralistic definition from the 
perspective of a social contract between different interest groups. But this 
still does not take us much further because we can never explain how 
a contract between unequal parties comes about and how those to be 
affected in the future come to form a part of this contract. If, as Rawls 
does, we turn to a cultural concept of the individual, we cannot respond 
to the universalism demanded by ethics in a global context, as we are then 
trapped in a particular anthropological conception (Habermas 1991a, 125).
It is necessary to introduce a methodological change and guide an 
ethical reflection from the participants’ perspective, regardless of whether 
they are involved in or affected by the company’s activity. Of course, it 
is not the case that each of us should take up the interests of the other 
groups or that we should put ourselves in their shoes but from our point 
of view, as in this way we remain in the theoretical vantage point of the 
observer. Rather, we should strive to clarify where the reasons underlying 
the trust or mistrust of the various groups involved are constructed; in 
other words, we should aim to identify the conditions of the sense of the 
business praxis, referring to the assumptions which guarantee and maintain 
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the social credibility or legitimacy of the business activities for each of the 
stakeholders that make up the company (Cortina et al., 1994). 
This sense cannot be reconstructed once and for all, nor need it be the 
same for all those involved, nor can it be interpreted from the point of 
view of one single interest. The moral point of view requires us to take 
into account all the participants’ perspectives. Consequently, the business 
principle of benefit, of the generation of added value, cannot be presented 
as a formal, neutral objective in the presence of the interests at stake but 
must reflect what all the interests have in common. It is obvious that 
generating benefit is the company’s objective, but depending on what we 
understand by benefit, how it is produced and for whom, we are looking 
at a fair or moral benefit. To think that profit is the same as economic 
benefit, or that the only interest which motivates company activity is 
financial, is, to put it bluntly, naive. 
The procedural rationality of discourse ethics provides us with a definition 
of legitimacy that is able to effect this change of perspective and thereby 
respect the plurality of interests in which the company operates. For the 
discourse approach, only dialogue and the subsequent acceptance by all the 
interest groups involved in and/or affected by the company can define the 
sense of the company as an organization, and following on from there, the 
fairness or morality of a business decision, action, or structure. It is therefore 
a moral principle proposed by discourse ethics but now interpreted as a 
reference point for company decision-making. Starting with Habermas’ 
principle of universalization and Ulrich’s idea of economic ethics, we obtain 
the following principle: A decision, action, norm, or the corporation itself 
could be considered morally valid when the foreseeable consequences and 
effects of its implementation on all the interests at stake can be accepted by all 
those involved or affected, both now and in the future, in a practical discourse 
conducted in symmetrical participative conditions (Ulrich 1987, 1997).
In my opinion, this moral principle that defines the position of discourse 
business ethics is the key to understanding the critical perspective that discourse 
ethics can bring to business ethics. It is not the theory which constructs 
this principle; rather it is an attempt to explain or to reconstruct the moral 
intuitions underlying the expectations placed in a company deserving to 
be called fair. As in any area of social praxis, regardless of its degree of 
formalization or institutionalization, what we are dealing with is the direct 
consequence of the moral principle of autonomy, of the idea that we are 
free beings able to solve social conflicts from the basis of our own freedom 
and autonomy, and that we are able to develop a common will. The moral 
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principle applied to the company interprets this principle of autonomy as 
the intersubjective recognition of all the individuals or groups involved in 
and/or affected by the business activity, together with their interests. The 
power differences and asymmetries in the sharing out of burdens and benefits 
can only be justified and accepted through the consensus or agreement that 
this asymmetry is the best alternative to satisfy their interests. The reasons 
on which trust is based refer to this idea of intersubjective agreement. 
In summary, the underlying idea behind this principle is that, given 
the case, and aware of the circumstances and consequences, we give our 
consent to or are in agreement with the established norms and the power 
structure laid down. But here we must be very clear about one thing: 
we are not dealing with a social contract that allows us to explain what 
actually exists, but with a moral contract that helps us to understand what 
should be (García-Marzá 2004, 145). The objective of this principle is 
to tell us not how a company behaves but how it should behave so that 
the sense it has for all its stakeholders, whether involved or affected, for 
all its interest groups, is not lost. 
The key to distinguishing between a social and a moral contract lies in 
the demand for symmetrical conditions for participation, a level playing 
field, since only by starting out from these ideal premises can we eliminate 
any form of coercion and place the agreement or consensus aspired to in the 
hands of the reasons named. A rationally motivated consensus, not brought 
about by strategy, force, or violence, can only arise from these conditions 
of symmetry and equality. In other words, not just any dialogue justifies 
the agreement; the agreement can only be considered fair when it has been 
reached under particular conditions. We are talking about ideal conditions, 
but conditions which we presuppose when we enter into discourse or 
deliberation on the trust we have in any specific business relation.
This difference between a moral and a social contract leads us to an 
inevitable tension between the ideal, which is the moral claim, and the 
economic business agreement reached in each particular case. That actual 
agreement, i.e., negotiations and commitments, will never completely 
meet these ideal conditions. However, they must be approached so the 
sense and credibility of the business activity is not lost. All collaboration 
and cooperation mechanisms, including strategy, demand this approach. 
Without it, we can only obtain mistrust and disrepute and therefore the 
only option open to us is the use of coercive mechanisms.
These ideal conditions can be summarized by the following four 
principles taken from an interpretation of Habermas’ texts:
111GaRcía-maRZá
BusINess ethIcs as aPPLIed ethIcs
1. Principle of sincerity. When engaging in discourse, the interested 
parties want to resolve their conflicts not through violence or 
compromise (strategy) but through dialogue, which implies 
argumentative obligations and rights.
2. Principle of inclusion. All potential present and future stakeholders 
or their representatives must take part in the dialogue. No one 
who might make a relevant contribution may be excluded from 
participating.
3. Principle of reciprocity. Participants must be able to converse under 
conditions that guarantee complete equality of opportunity and 
total symmetry in the conditions of participation and the ways 
the interests at stake may be interpreted.
4. Principle of publicity. All interests must be considered equal and 
open to argumentative revision: the symmetrical distribution of 
communicative freedoms. No interest may be considered definitive 
or free from criticism. 
These principles do not set out to describe a real situation; rather they 
normally constitute counterfactuals that reveal the assumptions which we 
in fact think are met when we are involved in or affected by a company’s 
decision or structure as participants. We talk about how a company should 
behave because we are not dealing with an operative criterion for decision-
making, but with a regulating idea which in practice always has to be put 
into operation after the fact. These principles enable us to evaluate or judge 
the conditions of social contracts, of companies and negotiations, and to 
measure their moral quality by the extent to which they are fulfilled. In 
short, they define moral validity: the final evaluation criterion from which 
the reasons supporting or criticizing the credibility of our business decisions 
must be constructed. Consequently, they comprise the cognitive source 
from which what we call here moral resources are constructed. 
With this reconstruction of company legitimacy in the form of a 
contract under ideal conditions, and with these conditions as the criteria 
for the moral validity of the agreements reached, we can determine a 
critical perspective for business ethics. This perspective is critical in two 
ways: as the reconstruction of the conditions of possibility of the business 
praxis sense, and as a petition for moral judgments to be made. At the 
same time, its procedural character makes a monological anticipation of the 
results impossible: it requires us to carry out real discourse and implement 
conditions in business (management styles, participative organization charts, 
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integration cultures in human resources, etc.) that make it possible. As a 
moral criterion, it demonstrates only the ideal horizon from which possible 
guidelines for action can be constructed and the real social agreements 
reached can be criticized, although it can never be identified with ideal 
rationality (Apel & Kettner, 1992). This tension is inherent to all social 
praxes and is the core of any critical perspective. 
However, a discourse approach to business ethics must not stop here 
with this normative perspective; rather, as an applied ethics, it must try 
to reach the business praxis itself and analyze how both the moral point 
of view and the principles on which it is based can be made operational. 
Without this undertaking, the effectiveness of this horizon on day-to-day 
business activity could become diluted when confronted with the excessive 
idealism of the moral contract. It could even lead to a loss of our critical 
viewpoint and to the adoption of conformist positions when faced with 
the extreme inequality of opportunity that goes hand in hand with all 
business activity. Without this analysis, it would be difficult to escape from 
both the company’s absolute lack of moral value and the real confusion 
prevailing today between what the company is and what it should be. 
Here we are dealing with presenting possibilities for the institutionalization 
of discourse in the business praxis and proposing maxims for action which 
facilitate the shaping of moral principles and maxims which we have 
explained from the principle of impartiality, or reciprocity, itself. At this 
level, discourse ethics cannot operate alone and needs to be complemented by 
other normative and empirical theories which help to put the reconstructed 
ethical principles into operation. These theories must fit into a hermeneutic 
synthesis which enables us to apply the reconstructed moral principle. 
Stakeholder Theory offers optimum complementation of the ideas 
put forward. It involves seeking methodological strategies that allow us 
to integrate ethical ideas with specific realities, and the use of this theory 
at all its levels, normative, strategic, and instrumental, is a good channel 
by which to approach the reality of business, provided that we know 
how to fit these proposals into the ethical framework established at the 
previous level. In this way, we meet two objectives at the same time: on 
the one hand, discourse ethics can offer Stakeholder Theory a normative 
grounding in accordance with the plurality and universality of present 
contexts, an aspect which has so far not been achieved (Clarkson 1998; 
Gibson 2000, 245-257), while on the other, the various approaches of 
Stakeholder Theory can offer discourse ethics a methodological access 
to business reality adapted to the reconstructed moral principle, thereby 
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providing the theory with a way out of the excessive abstraction in which 
it presently dwells (González Esteban, 2002).
To bring these notes to a close, it only remains to stress that this idea 
of a moral contract as a framework of reference for every social contract 
or balance of interests has not been invented by theory. Ethical theory 
aims to explain an idea which underlies the sense of the company as a 
social institution. It aims to show the sum and the interrelation of the 
social and individual expectations that underlie the various coordination 
mechanisms governing companies and their relations with the market and 
society. These expectations are not usually explicit, yet their cognitive 
content nonetheless constitutes the rational conviction that goes hand in 
hand with all claims to legitimacy, and therefore to trust. 
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